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New York State Court of Appeal Medical Malpractice Case
This medical malpractice case seeks to recover for injuries allegedly suffered by Tymeik Williams when he was born at Nassau County Medical Center (NCMC) on September 10, 1993. He began having seizures in 1994. In 1999, an audiologist and speech pathologist found that he was significantly delayed in speech and language development. His mother, Lekesha Fowler, commenced this action against NCMC and Nassau County in September 2003, four days after mailing a notice of claim to the defendants. Although General Municipal Law ยง 50-e (1) generally requires that a notice of claim be filed within 90 days of the date on which the alleged malpractice occurred, section 50-e (5) gives courts discretion to extend the time after considering relevant facts and circumstances. These considerations include "whether the public corporation ... acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within [the 90-day period] or within a reasonable time thereafter;" "whether the claimant was an infant, or mentally or physically incapacitated;" "and whether the delay in serving the notice of claim substantially prejudiced the public corporation in maintaining its defense on the merits."
Supreme Court granted leave to file a late notice of claim, saying, "[T]he plaintiff's failure to show a nexus between the infancy and the delay and her failure to offer a reasonable excuse for the ten year delay in making the instant application ... is not necessarily fatal when weighed against the factors of notice and the lack of prejudice to the municipality." He also ruled that medical records maintained by NCMC gave the defendants actual notice of "the facts and information needed to investigate this claim." He said, "The defendants do not dispute that the medical records ... noted that the infant claimant suffered a broken clavicle during birth, or that ... the administration of pitocen to the infant's [mother] to induce labor was contraindicated without first clinically assessing the size of the mother's pelvis to prevent damage to the fetal head and brain."
The Appellate Division, Second Department reversed, saying, "[T]he factor of infancy alone does not compel the granting of a motion for leave to serve a late notice of claim.... In this case, the 10-year delay in moving, in effect, for leave to serve a late notice of claim was not the product of the plaintiff's infancy...." The court also said it was not persuaded the defendants had actual notice of the claim. "Although it is true they were in possession of the pertinent medical records," the court said, "that did not establish that they had notice of the specific claim." The plaintiff argues that the Second Department's requirement that he show a nexus between his infancy and the delay in filing the notice of claim conflicts with the language of section 50-e (5) and with decisions of the other three departments. He also argues the plain language of the statute requires only that the defendant have actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim, not notice of the specific claim.
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